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FOREWORD
India’s defense establishment is undergoing an
unprecedented transformation as it modernizes its
military, seeks “strategic partnerships” with the United
States and other nations, and expands its influence in
the Indian Ocean and beyond. This transformation
includes a shift from an emphasis on the former Soviet
Union as the primary supplier of defense articles to a
western base of supply and an increasing emphasis on
bilateral exercises and training with many of the global
powers.
This Letort Paper by Lieutenant Colonel Brian
Hedrick explores the nature of this transformation,
offers insights into the history of Indian defense
relations, and suggests implications to U.S. foreign
and defense policy. Much has been written on India’s
relations with its neighbors, especially Pakistan and
China. In contrast, this Paper adds a new perspective
by taking a global view of India’s rise as a regional
and future global military power through its bilateral
defense relations and the potential conflict this creates
with India’s legacy as a leader of the Non-Aligned
Movement.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish
this important and informative Paper for leaders across
government and others with an interest in this subject
to foster a greater understanding of the dynamic
change occurring in the way India conducts its defense
relations around the world.
		
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Following India’s independence in 1947, then Prime
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru embarked on a foreign
policy that was based on principles of socialism and
remaining noncommittal to the emerging struggle
between the Soviet Union and the countries forming
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in
the post-World War II period. Eventually, this policy
led to India becoming one of the founding members
of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1955. In
practical terms, it placed India in a position of securing
bilateral international commitments only in situations
that were clearly neutral in nature or in cases of lastresort. The basic principles of nonalignment also
governed the military relationships of the Indian
defense establishment, resulting in limited military-tomilitary contacts, usually through United Nations (UN)
peacekeeping missions or training at foreign military
schools. These practices were generally followed by
his successors until the early 1990s when a changing
geopolitical structure and an internal economic crisis
began to challenge these principles.
India’s answer to this challenge is to reach out to as
many “friendly foreign countries” as possible to establish a balance of nonalignment with global multilateralism. The diversification of its defense supply
base from the Soviet Union and later Russia to western
suppliers resulted in a series of new agreements
supporting its diversification, while also securing
agreements with many of its smaller friends. Since
2000, India has increased the number of countries with
which it has defense-specific agreements from seven
to 26 by the end of 2008. Bilateral and multilateral
exercises are also an increasing feature of India’s
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expanding defense relations as it seeks to find new
technologies to transform its military from Cold War
era weapons to 21st century capabilities through such
opportunities.
India’s interests have changed over the past decade
or more, taking it from a position of nonalignment and
noncommitment to having specific strategic interests
taking it on a path of “poly-alignment.” This path
appears to be following four specific, but intermingled
courses:
• Becoming a regional power across the Indian
Ocean basin and securing agreements from
partners in this region that support this goal,
while building up expeditionary capabilities
in its navy and air force. At the same time, it
continues to modernize its army to deal with
potential threats from its immediate neighbors
and internal insurgency groups, and to
fulfill its goal of being a global leader in UN
peacekeeping.
• Developing “strategic partnerships” with
countries perceived as leaders of a global,
multipolar order and seeking modern military
capabilities from many of those countries. This
includes modern weapon systems as well as the
technology and licensed production associated
with those weapon systems.
• Securing or maintaining ties with smaller
countries globally, many of which are members
of the NAM, that can provide support in
international fora as well as provide potential
markets for its own emerging defense industry.
• Maintaining its position of leadership in
the NAM and publically presenting itself as
“nonaligned” despite its actual alignments in
the three above thrust areas.
vi

Many of the recent changes in India’s global defense
relationships represent a vast departure from past
policy and practices. Given that the Congress Party
and its United Progressive Alliance coalition received
a strong electoral mandate on its reelection in May
2009, these changes are likely to continue and perhaps
will see bold moves to further develop and deepen
strategic relationships around the world. As India
cements its expanding defense relationships through
purchase of major defense platforms and the associated
technology transfers and co-production agreements, it
will define the course of its long-term relationships for
the coming decades. This presents both opportunities
and challenges for the United States as it expands its
military ties with New Delhi.

vii

INDIA’S STRATEGIC DEFENSE
TRANSFORMATION:
EXPANDING GLOBAL RELATIONSHIPS
INTRODUCTION
Following India’s independence in 1947, then Prime
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru embarked on a foreign
policy that was based on principles of socialism and
remaining noncommittal to the emerging struggle
between the Soviet Union and the countries forming
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the
post-World War II period. Eventually, this policy led
to India becoming one of the founding members of
the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1955. Nehru’s
approach is often described as noncommittal, neutralist, and even immoral.1 In practical terms, it placed
India in a position of securing bilateral international
commitments only in situations that were clearly
neutral in nature or in cases of last resort. The basic
principles of nonalignment also governed the military
relationships of the Indian defense establishment,
resulting in limited military-to-military contact, and
those usually under the auspices of United Nations
(UN) peacekeeping missions2 or training at foreign
military schools.3 These practices were generally
followed by his successors until the early 1990s when
a changing geopolitical structure and an internal
economic crisis began to challenge these principles.
The past 2 decades witnessed a significant transformation of India’s geopolitical outlook. India’s
economic crisis in the 1990s and subsequent liberalization of the economy precipitated this transformation. In
the most recent decade, a number of events built upon
the earlier economic liberalization and led India to play
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a significant role as an emerging power. The events
involved in this shaping include testing of nuclear
weapons, the Kargil conflict with Pakistan, emergence
of India as an information technology services hub,
increasing participation in UN peacekeeping missions,
and broadening of global outlook. The result for the
Indian military’s foreign relationships is a departure
from the isolation of nonalignment, an increase in the
number of bilateral military agreements and military
contacts, and radical changes in the procurement of
military hardware.
Against this backdrop, the Indian military
establishment began an ambitious (albeit fragmented)
transformation that includes both the upgrading of
technologies and a more global approach to the way its
military engages with other nations. This monograph
looks at the evolution of India’s defense relationships,
primarily over the past decade, through key indicators
that include public statements describing bilateral
relationships, defense-specific agreements, defensespecific bilateral forums, exchanges of high-level
defense delegations, bilateral (and to a lesser extent
multilateral) military exercises, and significant defense
sales to India. These indicators were chosen to analyze
related factors that would give a general cross-section
of the strengths of military-to-military relationships.
They were also meant to be factors that would be
readily verifiable, although some proved more elusive
than others.4
As the appendix illustrates, India has cast a wide net
in establishing defense relationships world-wide, the
vast majority since 2000. The most significant of these
will be explored in some depth, while others will only
be briefly touched upon to deliver a sense of breadth
to the international activities of the Indian defense
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establishment. But before diving into the current
transformative processes, it is constructive to review
briefly the history of India’s military relations in the
context of its foreign policy to develop a framework
from which to define the scale of current changes.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
It is probably easiest to understand India’s defense
relationships by looking briefly at a series of periods
that ultimately shaped the trajectory of Indian defense
relations. These can roughly be broken down into the
following four periods—post colonial, regional conflict,
Cold War, and post-Cold War. Each segment is not
distinct as a specific period of time, but they are useful
segments of a continuum of evolving policy that have
significant overlap. Each period is defined by general
trends occurring within that period.
Defense Relations for a Post-Colonial India.
Following independence, India’s defense relations
were largely defined by Nehru’s foreign policy
and personal philosophy of nonalignment. Nehru
concluded that the best option for India was an
indigenous military-industrial complex that would
free it from foreign entanglements. However, India
did become a member of the British Commonwealth
of Nations after independence as a result of certain
necessities in the military and economic sectors, and
pressure from the British government.5 Nehru briefly
considered a military alignment with the United States
(and possibly others) as early as 1948, but was quickly
convinced otherwise by his close friend and advisor,
Krishna Menon, who would later become his Minister of
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Defense.6 Nehru was a strong supporter of the creation
of the UN in the post-World War II world, favoring it
as a potential forum for international mediation and
hinting at a preference for multilateralism.
Almost immediately following independence,
Nehru was confronted by a war with newly formed
Pakistan over the princely state of Kashmir. The war
began with Pakistan sending tribal irregulars across
the border into Kashmir, to be followed up by regular
forces once the Indian Army was brought in to deal
with the irregular forces. In the wake of this war,
India logically turned to its former colonial master, the
United Kingdom (UK), as well as the United States and
France, for the purchase of defense equipment to arm
its military.7 The UN was eventually called in to broker
a cease-fire, but not in a way that set well with India.
This war set the stage for an enduring rivalry between
India and Pakistan that would preoccupy Indian
foreign policy for more than 5 decades. It also involved
the UN in what India considered to be a domestic or at
best a bilateral issue and highlighted for Nehru and his
successors that the UN had its limitations and would
be dominated by the great powers. Additionally, it
established a precedent for Pakistan of using irregular
forces to fight a proxy-war in ways that would later be
increasingly characterized as terrorism.
India supported UN military efforts in the Korean
War by sending a medical unit under the UN flag
and was active in the UN diplomacy on the Korean
peninsula in the 1950s. This was independent India’s
first foray onto the international security stage and the
Indian Army’s first deployment on a UN mission. In
subsequent years, India tended to favor anti-western
initiatives in the UN while opposing those that
intervened in South Asia.8 It maintained a policy (with
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a few regional exceptions) that it would only deploy
troops under the UN flag as a de facto extension of its
policy of nonalignment.
In the mid-1950s, Pakistan sought (and was
pressured) to join a number of international treaty
organizations in the wake of and for the purposes of
containing expanding communist regimes in Asia.
Specifically, in 1955 Pakistan aligned with the west
in joining the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
(SEATO) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).
India’s response was to formalize its policy of
nonalignment by co-founding the Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM) among like-minded third-world
countries that same year. India conceived the NonAligned Movement to provide a forum that was devoid
of the entanglements of bilateral and multilateral
treaties, but theoretically provided security through
a position of neutrality in solidarity with other
similarly disposed countries. It primarily had an antiimperialist focus on the great powers, but had the
practical consequence of limiting significant bilateral
agreements with all countries.9
A Decade of Regional Conflict.
The decade beginning in the early 1960s and
extending a few years into the 1970s witnessed India’s
involvement in three wars on the subcontinent;
one with China and two with Pakistan. These three
wars significantly altered India’s global views and
challenged the efficacy of the NAM.
As early as the late 1950s, Nehru continually resisted
the call of the right-wing opposition in parliament to
join western military alliances to protect itself from an
increasingly aggressive China that refused to recognize
the McMahon line demarcating the boundary between
5

India and Tibet.10 Nehru naively believed that China
would not use military force to assert its claims and
even moved Indian forces into disputed areas. Once
China attacked, Nehru was left with no choice but
to accept the U.S. offer of military assistance from
U.S. Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith, as India
lacked the military hardware to fight China.11 This
highlighted the weakness of NAM in two areas: (1)
nonalignment did not protect India from China in the
way that Nehru envisioned it would, nor did the other
nonaligned countries rally to India’s aid; (2) in an ironic
twist of fate, it was the United States and other powers
that India specifically wanted to remain unentangled
from that came to India’s rescue with support and
equipment. India continued to hold to the lofty ideals
of NAM, but the war itself was a wakeup call and a
5-year defense plan was introduced that called for
expansion and modernization of the military through
foreign purchases, and nearly doubled the defense
budget.12
Following the war with China, Pakistan saw a
window of weakness in India’s military power and
in 1965 used the opportunity to attempt to capture
the rest of Kashmir before the opportunity closed.
However, Pakistan had grossly underestimated Indian
capabilities, and India not only repulsed Pakistan’s
attacks but was able to threaten Lahore, which is
merely 30 kilometers from the border. Practically,
though, the war was a stalemate because neither side
could effectively gain significant ground in Kashmir
due to a number of strategic miscalculations on both
sides. Again, NAM proved ineffective, and it took the
intervention of the great powers to establish a UNsponsored cease-fire line.13
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India went to war again with Pakistan in 1971
as a consequence of its support of the Bangladesh
independence struggle in East Pakistan. India did
not immediately become directly involved due to the
fact that the Army’s Eastern Command was scattered
throughout West Bengal supporting the recently
concluded elections, and the summer monsoons had
set in, making it difficult for India to employ its armor
in East Pakistan. Instead, India provided support and
training to the guerrilla forces of the independence
movement until conditions improved in its favor.14 In
the prelude to this impending conflict, India’s concerns
about the balance of power in the region compelled it
to sign its first bilateral treaty of “Peace, Friendship,
and Cooperation” with the Soviet Union, which stated
that each country would come to the aid of the other if
attacked.15 The Soviet Union was already a significant
supplier of defense equipment to India, but with the
signing of this first treaty, the Soviets quickly became
India’s primary supplier of defense equipment. By this
time, India understood its ability to procure equipment
was an important security objective, and its defense
relations were singularly focused on maintaining
“reliable suppliers.”
The Cold War.
Following the independence of Bangladesh, the
significance of a bipolar global security structure
became increasingly apparent to the Indian political
establishment. The withdrawal of U.S. military
support during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war initiated
this, but it was cemented in the aftermath of the 1971
war where the United States demonstrated solidarity
with Pakistan (at least from the Indian point of view)
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by sailing the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise near the
entrance to the Bay of Bengal and suspended what
little military assistance it was providing to India.
Additionally, China sided with Pakistan in the war and
denounced India. While the war itself was essentially a
bilateral matter between India and Pakistan, it had the
effect of highlighting the big power dynamics between
the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, and
raised questions again about the effectiveness of
nonalignment.16
India gave little attention to its nuclear policy after
independence; however, some of its nuclear scientists
worked quietly on developing a nuclear explosive
device for “peaceful purposes.” When China conducted
its first nuclear test in 1964, India became concerned
at having a nuclear power on its doorstep, especially
one it had just been to war with, but the government
was quickly distracted by the war with Pakistan and
domestic political issues so did not focus on its own
program. Following the 1971 war, Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi and others in India’s political elite were
concerned about the way New Delhi had become a
pawn in the power-game between Washington,
Moscow, and Beijing, and were unhappy at not being
treated as a major power. Consequently, the government
began more actively pursuing development of a
nuclear explosive device around 1972 and then tested
it in 1974 in what was termed a “peaceful nuclear
explosion.” However, it is important to note that this
period was also one of great turmoil in internal politics,
and therefore it is often argued that this achievement
was a demonstration of India’s technical know-how
and an opportunity to inspire pride, nationalism, and
a sense of achievement for the country. India opted not
to weaponize its new capability and remained satisfied
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with the knowledge that it had clearly indicated it had
the know-how.17
On Christmas Day 1979, the Soviet Union invaded
Afghanistan to subdue and control a brutal political
struggle that had been brewing over the previous year
between the communists and other political factions.
This event again brought the major powers into the
affairs of South Asia and had significant implications
for India’s foreign policy. The United States quickly
reversed sanctions previously imposed against
Pakistan, which had limited its military procurements
and development of its nuclear program, and
established bases and support for the mujahedeen
fighting the Soviets and Soviet-backed communists.
This had ramifications for New Delhi, as renewed
support to Pakistan allowed for revitalization of its
nuclear program and military modernization. India
was faced with the dilemma of not wanting to upset
the Soviets by objecting to the invasion, which it did,
in fact, oppose on principle, but only offered mild
criticism, as it did not want to offend its only source
of military equipment. India found itself in a position
of trying to balance goodwill with the United States
to hedge against a Sino-American-Pakistan axis, while
sustaining the support of the Soviet Union.18
When the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan
in 1988, the United States no longer had a rationale for
continuing military support to Pakistan. While military
support would not end immediately, the United States
found it increasingly difficult to certify that Pakistan
did not have a nuclear weapons program. Finally,
in October 1990 U.S. President George H. W. Bush’s
administration notified Congress that it could no
longer certify that Pakistan did not possess nuclear
weapons. From this point forward, both India and
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Pakistan considered themselves demonstrated and
de facto nuclear weapons powers, respectively, which
initiated strategic planning in India on developing
a nuclear doctrine considering the implications of
a nuclear war with Pakistan. The failure to certify
Pakistan also initiated Pressler Amendment sanctions
against Pakistan, which once again made it difficult
for Pakistan to obtain conventional weapons from the
United States. A delivery of F-16 fighter aircraft was
suspended as a result of these sanctions, and Pakistan
was forced to seek its weapons purchases from China
alone.19 At the same time, the international order
was changing as the Soviet Union pursued a policy
of rapprochement with the United States and China
under Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost.
The End of the Cold War.
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 came as
a shock to India, as the Russian Federation did not
carry the same clout and could no longer provide the
kind of support for India in international fora that
its predecessor had. The new Russia also no longer
accepted the barter of goods and materials for military
hardware in the same way the Soviet Union had, and
its defense industry was in shambles. India now had
to pay hard currency, something that was in short
supply in the early 1990s. Despite a shortage of cash,
India accelerated a process of looking westward for
military hardware that was begun by Prime Minister
Rajiv Gandhi.
India experienced a major economic crisis in 1991
that stemmed from growing trade deficits and increased
capital expenditures in the 1980s that resulted in a
critical reduction in foreign exchange reserves.20 Some
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of this was a result of trade deficits with large trading
partners such as the Soviet Union and because of
capital investment in public sector companies (many of
them in the defense sector) that, despite large amounts
of capital, were not producing anything. This in turn
caused the government to purchase more equipment
from foreign (mostly Soviet) suppliers.21 To raise
much-needed capital, the government took significant
steps to liberalize the economy from the socialist model
pursued in the past. This opened up many areas for
foreign investment, and the Indian defense sector saw
this as an opportunity to obtain much needed technical
know-how from foreign (primarily Western) defense
companies.
The economic liberalization had a psychological
effect on other areas, and as a result, the Indian
defense establishment began looking outward for
more international interaction beyond its participation
in UN peacekeeping missions. U.S. Lieutenant General
Claude Kicklighter traveled to India in 1991 and signed
the first Indo-U.S. agreement to expand Army-toArmy contacts. This was followed a few years later in
1995 when the “Agreed Minute on Defense Relations”
was signed by Secretary of Defense William Perry and
Indian Minister of Defense S. B. Chavan and expanded
the scope of the bilateral relationship to joint exercises
and the possibility of technology transfers. However, a
shift to the West was not easy. Most of India’s equipment
was from the Soviet bloc, as was the related support
structure. The Indian government had planned to
begin inducting indigenously produced equipment by
the 1990s, but the failure of the state-owned industries
to deliver left it needing an alternative source, and
shortages of foreign exchange made direct purchases
few and far-between.
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In May 1998, India conducted two nuclear tests,
which were shortly followed by tests in Pakistan.
These tests again brought the specter of sanctions
to South Asia, but this was of little consequence to
Pakistan, which was already sanctioned. Many of
India’s attempts to procure from the West (especially
the United States) were placed on hold, leaving few,
if any, options for military modernization. Notably,
Russia did not impose sanctions after the tests, but
did join with the other permanent members of the UN
Security Council in condemning them.22
The line of control running through Jammu and
Kashmir that separates India and Pakistan-controlled
sides of the state runs through some of the most
treacherous terrain in the world. Consequently, the
Indian Army vacates many of its highest outposts
during the winter months. In the spring of 1999, when
the army units returned to their posts, they found that
Pakistani regular and irregular forces had occupied
the outposts a few weeks earlier. The Indian Army,
supported by the Indian Air Force, fought a miniwar with Pakistan over its positions along the line of
control. The war itself was limited only to those areas
where India had to reclaim its outposts. However, it
took on a larger strategic context as both countries had
just tested nuclear weapons, and the conflict attracted
the attention of the international community. The
United States brokered a cease-fire 2 months after
fighting began and for the first time, backed India
in a conflict with Pakistan. The war also highlighted
for India its shortcomings in equipment, especially
sensor technologies such as night vision equipment
and ground surveillance radar. India began a more
aggressive procurement program after the Kargil
War, but its implementation was hampered by the
limitations of the Indian bureaucracy.
12

India and Pakistan escalated tensions approximately 2 1/2 years later, with both the Kargil War and the
events of September 11, 2001, in the United States
fresh in their minds when members of the Pakistansponsored Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorist organization
attacked the Indian parliament building on December
13, 2001. Both countries mobilized their militaries in a
standoff that lasted until the summer of 2002. Multiple
attempts by the international community to mediate
were limited in effectiveness, and ultimately both sides
had to agree bilaterally to demobilize. The lessons
for India in the wake of the Kargil conflict and 2002
escalation with Pakistan were that it needed to change
the way it viewed its defense relations and significantly
revamp its procurement mechanisms.
Over the course of a little more than 5 decades,
India went from a country with a firm position on
nonalignment to a country looking for opportunities
to enhance its security by developing strong defense
connections with what it termed “friendly foreign
countries.” Until the late 1990s, India primarily viewed
its defense relationships with other countries through
the lens of defense trade. With few exceptions, the
solidity of the relationship was based on what the
country was willing to sell to India and under what
terms, and in some cases that meant military grant aid.
This was a realm that was almost exclusively dominated
by the Soviet Union, which entered into the first bilateral defense agreement with India in 1971. By 1990,
only two other countries had entered into defense agreements with India. Mauritius signed a defense agreement in 1974 whereby India would provide leadership
to the Mauritius Coast Guard from the Indian Navy.23
Then in 1982 India signed a memorandum of understanding on the supply of defense equipment with
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France. By the end of the 1990s, India was seeking to
develop other sources of supply for military equipment
and had signed an additional three agreements on
defense equipment with Italy, South Africa, and the UK
in addition to the aforementioned agreements with the
United States. In 2002, India published the first iteration
of its Defence Procurement Procedure, which was meant
to establish processes for defense purchases, to include
competitive bids. Some in the defense establishment
were beginning to see the benefits of other forms of
bilateral interactions resulting in the aforementioned
two agreements on defense cooperation in exercises
and training with the United States. Individual defense
relationships and how procurement and other forms
of engagement are altering Indian defense policy are
further explored.
Russia.
India’s current relationship with Russia is shaped
by its previous relationship with the Soviet Union. The
fall of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)
left in its wake a weaker Russia and a new global
dynamic that significantly altered that relationship.
The Soviet Union offered relatively high technology
weapons and equipment on very favorable terms
without many of the strings of western suppliers.
Until the 1990s, the USSR held the upper hand in
the bilateral relationship—it had military equipment
India needed, was willing to give India favorable
terms (sometimes in the form of barter), and India
had limited options for supply; but India had some
leverage in being a significant component of Soviet
defense exports. Once the Soviet Union broke up, the
situation began to reverse. Russia faced the challenge
of restructuring industries that were now spread across
14

several independent republics. The new Russia and its
defense industry were plagued by increasing costs,
a loss of many important scientists and engineers,
and increasingly poor quality of its products. Its only
deliveries to India in the mid-1990s were from orders
originally placed with the Soviet Union.24 By the late
1990s, India was already looking for new suppliers,
and by 2002 had begun soliciting competitive bids
under its new Defence Procurement Procedure.
In 2000, newly elected President of Russia Vladimir
Putin initiated a revitalization of the Russian defense
sector in hopes of recapturing its lost business from
India and other former customers, including creation
of the state arms monopoly Rosoboronexport. On his
first visit to India in October of that same year, Putin
managed to close approximately $3 billion in purchases
from a desperate India that had just fought the Kargil
War and was experiencing significant shortages of
equipment. President Putin and then Prime Minister
Atal Bihari Vajpayee also agreed to raise the level of
the India-Russia Inter-Governmental Commission on
Military Technical Cooperation from the level of their
Defense Secretaries to India’s Defense Minister and
Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister for Defense Exports.25
This remains India’s highest level bilateral defense
dialog with any country.
Understanding that India was broadening its scope
of sources for defense purchases, Russia sought to retain a large share of its market. To do so, it appealed
to India’s growing desire for technology by offering a
number of co-development and co-production deals.
This initially included Su-30 fighter aircraft and T-90
tanks, mostly built from kits.26 However, Russia
demanded that India sign an Intellectual Property
Rights Agreement before it would provide any more
technology. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and
15

President Putin signed the agreement in 2005, but
only after India shrewdly insisted that it only apply to
technology purchased after the signing of the agreement.
It also apparently states that Russia is India’s preferred
supplier.27 Once the agreement was signed, India and
Russia inked a number of very lucrative deals, many
of which were in negotiation for years. Among these
were the sales of the Russian aircraft carrier Admiral
Gorshkov, which is being significantly modified and
lease of an Akula-II class nuclear submarine, which
India will use to train sailors while it builds its own
nuclear sub. Additionally, Russia and India have
entered into agreements for co-development of the
BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, a fifth-generation
multirole fighter aircraft, a medium transport aircraft,
hypersonic cruise missiles, and an assortment of
smaller systems and subsystems.28
In 2003 Russia and India held their first bilateral
exercise, Indra, in the Sea of Japan with their two
navies. This desire to change and expand the nature
of their relationship was likely the result of desires on
both sides. India was already reaching out more to
other countries for engagement beyond defense sales
and wanted to ensure Russia did not feel excluded, and
Russia was eager to counter the U.S. influence in this
area where a number of Indo-U.S. bilateral exercises
had already taken place. The Indian Army conducted
its first combined exercise with Russia in 2005, and
the 2007 iteration included a contingent of Indian Air
Force personnel. Naval exercises have tended to focus
on piracy, smuggling, and terrorism while the Army/
Air Force exercises focus on counterterrorism under a
UN mandate.29
India and Russia have also had a significant number
of problems over the past decade, most having to do
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with delayed deliveries and cost escalations. The most
visible of these issues centers on the purchase of the
Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier and its associated
MiG-29 fighters. The Gorshkov was essentially gifted to
India for the price of one dollar, and India signed a
contract for $1.5 billion in 2004 for the refurbishment
and aircraft, with a 2008 delivery date. As of February
2009, the Russians had increased the cost of the carrier
to $2.9 billion for the package, up from $2.1 billion in
November 2007. Delivery is now projected for 2012.30
India has already renamed the aircraft carrier the INS
Vikramaditya, but the issue has severely strained IndoRussian relations. Indian Navy Chief Admiral Sureesh
Mehta initially opposed any increases in cost, but
has since relented31 since Russia essentially has India
over a barrel because their current aircraft carrier, INS
Viraat, is scheduled to be decommissioned in a few
years. However, subsequent intervention by Defense
Minister A. K. Antony and Defense Secretary Vijay
Singh may have caused the Russians to relent, at least
a little.32 India has also experienced cost increases in its
Su-30 aircraft deal, delivery of Il-38SD maritime patrol
aircraft without necessary avionics and weapons,
faulty ammunition, and poor quality in a variety of
Russian arms.33 The Indian military services are vocal
in their complaining about the multitude of issues
with Russian defense equipment, but the Ministry of
Defense bureaucrats and politicians are still reluctant
to irritate Russia significantly by holding a hard line or
cancelling their deals.
Despite their problems, India has gone out of its
way to ensure it retains a solid relationship with its
reliable old friend. In 2007, when many of the issues
were coming to a head, Prime Minister Singh invited
President Putin to be the guest of honor at the Republic
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Day parade, a tactic often used to demonstrate
friendship.34 Russia is second only to the United States
in the number of high-level delegations to India, but
beats out the United States in frequency of cabinetlevel defense visits. Russia is usually the destination
of choice when a new Minister of Defense takes over;
Minister of Defense A. K. Antony made Russia his
second trip after assuming office, and during that
trip characterized the relationship as one of “mutual
cooperation of joint production.”35 Citing Russia as a
“strategic partner” on a number of occasions, India
has also secured a number of additional defense
agreements on bilateral defense cooperation and joint
development of a number of military systems.
United Kingdom.
Although India inherited its military from the British
Empire and has been a member of the Commonwealth
of Nations since independence, it did not develop a
significant bilateral defense relationship until after
the two countries signed a “Defence Equipment
Memorandum of Understanding” in 1997. Prior to
that, the UK had moderate defense trade with India
that peaked during the Indo-China war and tapered
off during the 1970s and early 1980s. Trade began
to expand again in the 1980s with India’s purchase
of Sea King helicopters and a second aircraft carrier.
In the 1990s, Indian defense purchases from the UK
included Jaguar and Harrier aircraft, and a Leanderclass frigate.36 The signing of the “Defence Equipment
Memorandum of Understanding,” was Britain’s first
military agreement with India since 1947. Britain also
began holding regular defense consultations with India
through an “India-UK Defense Consultative Group”
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that is co-chaired by the Indian Defense Secretary
and the UK Permanent Under Secretary of State for
Defense. Since its inception, military-to-military
contacts and research and development increasingly
add to discussions, in addition to the traditional
defense procurement issues. In 2004, India and Britain
entered into their first co-production agreement for the
Hawk advanced jet trainer aircraft and have a number
of on-going projects involving VVIP helicopters,
communications networks, naval support vessels, and
upgrades to existing equipment.37 Between 2003 and
2007, India signed contracts for approximately $1.7
billion in defense sales. Britain is not selling many of the
“big ticket” items to India, but it has an important and
growing defense supply relationship. As an indicator,
the UK was projected to be the largest foreign vendor at
the 2009 Aero India air show in number of companies
represented.38
Despite sharing a common military lineage and
having the common language of English, India and
Britain did not carry out bilateral military exercises
until 2005 when joint exercise Emerald Mercury was
conducted in Hyderabad. Prior to that, there was only
a limited tradition of exchanging officers at the staff
college and war college levels, and a few other disparate
training opportunities, something routinely done with
many of India’s friendly foreign countries. Since 2005
and under the direction of the “India-UK Defense
Consultative Group,” the two countries conducted the
Konkan naval carrier group joint exercise in the Bay of
Bengal in 2006, Himalayan Warrior Army-Marine high
altitude exercise in India and Indradhanush Air Force
exercise in the UK in 2007, and the Lion’s Strike and
Wessex Warrior Army exercises in the UK in 2008.39
Most of these exercises appear to be on track as annual
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or biennial events, with locations alternating between
India and the UK.
The Indo-British relationship is consistently
characterized as a “strategic partnership” and is
evidenced by the statements made during increasingly
regular reciprocal visits.
European Union.
The relationship between India and the European
Union (EU) is as new as the EU itself and is a descendent
of past bilateral relationships between individual EU
countries and India. The EU does not get extensively
involved in defense matters, but because defense
sales make up a large share of the relationship due
to the European defense consortiums such as Airbus,
Eurofighter, and Eurocopter, we need to consider the
collective relationship as well as the individual bilateral
relationships of individual states.
Of all the EU member states, France has the most
robust and long-standing bilateral relationship with
India, and the EU relationship derives much of its
strength from this relationship. France began selling
defense equipment to India in 1949, and despite
early Indian skepticism due to earlier French colonial
policies that limited the defense relationship, France
was and is considered a “reliable supplier.” The IndoFrench relationship did not really take off until 1962
when France finally relinquished its possessions in
India, clearing away the colonial issues, and India
was attacked by China as previously discussed. While
France joined with the United States and UK sanctioning India in 1965 during the war with Pakistan, France
was the first to lift sanctions and resume defense
trade a year later. France probably did the best job
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of delinking its defense trade with its foreign policy;
to the extent that it also had a fairly robust defense
trade with Pakistan. While the French never achieved
the scale of defense sales that the Soviet Union did,
they did provide some western technology desired
by India and at least some diversification away from
Soviet sources. Consequently, France was the second
major power to sign a defense agreement with India
when both countries signed the “Memorandum of
Understanding on Supply of Defense Equipment” in
1982.40 Among the purchases from France in the 1980s
were Mirage-2000 fighter aircraft, air surveillance
radars, and anti-tank missiles.41 The relationship
remained strictly commercial and did not have any
overt political linkages whatsoever, which fit nicely
with India’s position of nonalignment.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, France was
best positioned to offer western technology to India
and further develop its supply relationship. However,
India’s financial crisis in the early 1990s curtailed early
progress. By 1995, India and France had begun talks
to revitalize the Defense Cooperation Working Group,
and in January 1998 French President Jacques Chirac
was invited to be chief guest at the annual Republic
Day Parade. During this visit, both countries decided to
expand the dialog beyond just defense procurements.
To its credit (from the Indian point of view), France
did not sanction India after the 1998 nuclear tests but
adopted a more “progressive” approach. While this did
not result in any significant immediate advantage for
France, the point is still remembered in South Block.42
After 2000, things began to change. France and
India began to have more substantive discussions in the
biennial strategic dialog between the Indian Principal
Secretary to the Prime Minister and the French Special
Envoy, and in the annual high committee on defense
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cooperation held between the Indian Defense Secretary
and his French counterpart. Both dialogs added global
issues to the agenda in addition to defense procurement,
resulting in a significant increase in joint training and
exercises and increased contact between senior defense
officials. Regular visits of the chiefs of military services
rarely, if ever, occurred before 1998; afterwards, visits
began to occur on an almost annual basis, but recently
involved more Indians travelling to France rather than
the other way around. Because of the naval presence
in the French possessions in the Indian Ocean, the
French and Indian navies began exercising together as
early as 1998. By 2003, regular air force exercises were
taking place.43 Defense sales expanded in the last 10
years as India purchased additional Mirage-2000s and
Exocet missiles and leased Scorpene submarines from
France.44 France is also competing the Rafale fighter
in the Indian Air Force medium multirole combat
aircraft competition and has offered extensive transfer
of technology for this and other defense sales. During
Prime Minister Singh’s visit to France for the Bastille
Day parade in July 2009, both leaders pledged to
increase defense cooperation, and Singh characterized
the relationship as “a close and wide ranging strategic
partnership”45
The Indo-French relationship does have its
problems. France’s strong ties to both Pakistan
and China were not a significant issue when the
relationship was procurement-based, but now that the
relationship encompasses more strategic issues, this
may have implications in the long run. Former Prime
Minister Atal Bihar Vajpayee stated that France had
to “make a strategic decision between . . . India and
Pakistan.”46 France has also been accused of corruption
(and exonerated) in the Scorpene submarine deal, and
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a $600 million deal to buy helicopters from a French
production unit of Eurocopter had to be cancelled due
to allegations of corruption in the bidding process.47
Cases such as this create perceptions that will take time
to overcome. France and India also have the problem
of not having a common language, which will likely
hamper certain aspects of the strategic relationship.
Germany.
Germany’s defense relationship with India is
a fairly recent development. While both countries
exchanged students at service schools as early as
1978,48 defense ties were very limited. According to
the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, the “strategic
partnership” began in 2001.49 India and Germany signed
the Defense and Security Cooperation agreement in
2006, their first defense agreement. This was followed
in 2007 with an agreement on “Mutual Protection of
Classified Information.” India and Germany hold
regular meetings at the Defense Secretary-level
and hold subgroup meetings on Strategic Defense
Cooperation, Defense Technical Cooperation, and
Military to Military Cooperation. While Germany does
not have a significant trade relationship with India
yet, it has been designated as the lead country for the
Eurofighter bid for the medium multi-role combat
aircraft competition.
Italy.
Italy has a modest defense trade relationship
with India that began in 1970; however, it did not
amount to much until 1993 when India placed an
order for anti-submarine warfare torpedoes for its
Bhramaputra and Shivalik-class frigates.50 One year
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later, the two countries signed a Memorandum of
Understanding for Defense Cooperation in the field
of Defense Equipment, which was renewed again
in 2003. In recent years, Italy has been marketing its
defense products to include C-27C transport aircraft,
AugustaWestland helicopters, and a variety of naval
weapons.51 Italy is also providing design consultancy
to India for parts of its indigenous aircraft carrier
project.52 Italy has not yet progressed to the point of
establishing regular exercises with the Indian military
or exchanges of students at the professional military
colleges; but since the 2003 signing of a Memorandum
of Understanding on Defense Cooperation, Italian
and Indian defense establishments conducted regular,
senior-level interaction. The relationship continues to
be primarily focused on defense trade.
Sweden.
Sweden’s relationship with India is also almost
exclusively defense trade based and consists exclusively
of the 1986 sale of the FH-77 Bofors howitzers to India.
This particular deal later became embroiled in one of
the largest cases of graft and corruption in defense sales
and was a major factor in the defeat of Prime Minister
Rajiv Gandhi’s party in 1989 parliamentary elections.
The ensuing scandal eventually led to stricter laws
on corruption and the addition of an “integrity pact”
as a requirement for all defense sales in the “Defense
Procurement Procedure.”53 Sweden entered its JAS39 Gripen fighter in the medium multi-role combat
aircraft competition.
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Israel.
India only extended full diplomatic recognition
to Israel in 1992. Prior to that, it maintained limited
contact with the Jewish state due to concerns about
inflaming its large Muslim population over Palestine
and Cold War politics. Since then, Israel surpassed
France to become India’s second largest defense
supplier with the conclusion of a $1.1 billion contract to
sell the Phalcon airborne warning and control system
(AWACS), and both countries are jointly developing
a $2.5 billion surface-to-air missile system. Israel
presents a very favorable arms source for India, as it
is willing to transfer technology to India with few, if
any, strings attached as other western suppliers do.
The main limitation is that some of Israel’s technology
is derived from U.S. technology, which does have strict
arms control measures.54
Counterterrorism and intelligence cooperation are
the largest bilateral strategic issues.55 Both countries
signed an intelligence sharing agreement in 2007 and
hold regular talks on counterterrorism. It is important
to note that much of the counterterrorism cooperation
happens outside of the Indian Ministry of Defense, as
this is mainly an issue for the Ministry of Home Affairs
and Ministry of External Affairs. India and Israel have
conducted bilateral army and air force exercises, with
a focus on counterterrorism. The Ministry of Defense
does hold regular talks with Israel through the IndiaIsrael Joint Defense Committee and India-Israel Joint
Working Group on Defense Cooperation, the former
held at the Defense Secretary-level. Bilateral meetings
at the service chief-level and below are now occurring
on a regular basis. India has thus far been relatively
successful at balancing a strong defense relationship
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with Israel in contrast to its policies and relationships
with regard to both Palestine and Iran. However, the
left parties in India tend to be critical of the relationship
with Israel, and the relationship has had to endure
accusations of impropriety in defense deals such as
India’s selection of the Israeli Medium-Range Surface
to Air missile instead of the indigenous Advanced Air
Defense Missile produced by the Defense Research and
Development Organization (DRDO). The government
is also criticized for not conducting the procurement
through a global tender.56
NAM Partners and Others.
India’s relationships with members of the NAM
and other countries take on a different dynamic than
that of the global powers. In these relationships, India
is the larger power, and in many cases the supplier of
military hardware and/or military training. Among
many developing countries, NAM has been a common
bond, as has membership in the British Commonwealth
with a smaller set of countries.
India’s relationship with South Africa extends
from well before its independence, as both have a
common bond of throwing off the yoke of British
rule in the 20th century. Militarily, however, the
relationship was less involved, and India has served
as both supplier and recipient of arms. In the 1970s,
India supplied Centurion tanks to South Africa and
in the late 1990s and 2000s received Casspir armored
personnel carriers from South Africa.57 There is also
some trade in small arms and ammunition. Despite
this limited defense sales relationship, both countries
signed a Memorandum of Understanding concerning
Cooperation in the Field of Defense Equipment in 1996
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followed by an Agreement on Defense Co-operation in
2000. A subsequent Agreement on Supply of Defense
Equipment was signed in 2003. India and South Africa
have an established bilateral defense forum, the “IndiaSouth Africa Joint Defense Committee” and the chiefs
of the South African Army and Navy both visited
India as recently as 2007. South Africa also sends a few
military officers to Indian defense schools.58 The navies
interact through a newly established trilateral naval
exercise that also includes ships and personnel from
the Brazilian Navy.
Brazil is the third leg of the India-Brazil-South
Africa (IBSA) dialog forum trilateral commission that
seeks to strengthen the multilateral system in areas
such as UN Security Council reform and promoting
“South-South cooperation” across three continents
and among three regional powers in their respective
neighborhoods. Because of the distances involved,
defense ties between Brasilia and New Delhi have been
limited. However, India purchased six executive jets
from Brazilian airplane manufacturer Embraer in 2003
for the Air Force and recently entered into a deal with
the same company to jointly develop an airborne early
warning and control aircraft based on the EMB-145.59
Also in 2003, India and Brazil signed an “Agreement
on Defense Cooperation,” their first bilateral defense
agreement, which also led to the aforementioned
trilateral naval exercise with South Africa. Brazil also
has a nascent defense sales relationship with Pakistan,
but like France, has been able to manage it with regard
to its relationship with India.60
Ecuador has emerged as an important procurer
from India’s defense sector with the purchase of 12
Dhruv Advanced Light Helicopters from Hindustan
Aeronautics Ltd. India is also attempting to break
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into the defense aviation markets in Peru, Bolivia, and
Venezuela.61
Iran presents an interesting problem for India in
terms of defense relationships due to the close scrutiny
given the overall Indo-Iranian relationship by the west,
and especially the United States. India maintained good
relations with Iran both before and after the revolution.
In recent years, it has focused primarily on access to
Central Asian energy and as a route into Afghanistan
to support its reconstruction projects. Defense relations
are very limited, but the two countries have conducted
small-scale naval exercises since 2003.62 Additionally,
India trains a few Iranian naval officers each year.63
India and Iran do not have a separate, specific, defense
agreement, but the language of the 2003 “New Delhi
Declaration” includes an agreement “to explore
opportunities for cooperation in defense, including
training and exchange of visits.”64 The Iranian Navy
Commander visited India in 2007 and since then
Indian senior military leadership has also visited Iran.
India’s limited relationship with Iran, while necessary
for limited strategic reasons and to appease certain
segments of the Indian domestic population, is often
problematic for its relationship with the United States
and Israel.65
Mauritius and Tajikistan present unique cases of
India’s defense relationships as both involve the only
operational basing of Indian military outside of India.
Mauritius has a defense agreement that has been in
place since 1974 whereby the Indian Navy provides
military leadership to the Mauritius Coast Guard on
deputation. India has also transferred naval vessels
and equipment to Mauritius over the years.66 More
recently, India has signed a basing agreement with
Tajikistan that gives it access to a Tajik Air Force Base
that is also shared with the Russians.67
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Australia, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea are
all developing emerging defense relationships with
India, with each having an independent focus guiding
the direction of the relationship. All have signed
bilateral defense agreements with India, and with the
exception of South Korea, all have regular bilateral
defense talks. Australia and Japan are focused on
maritime security and participated in the multilateral
Malabar naval exercise, along with India, the United
States, and Singapore in 2007. In addition to the
maritime security focus, Singapore is also interested
in using India’s military training facilities due to its
own lack of large training areas as evidenced by the
agreements for training on Army and Air Force bases.
These agreements are unique for India and provide
Singapore a training location much closer than the
United States, where it currently conducts much of its
training. Singapore is also interested in tapping the
Indian defense market and was marketing its Pegasus
lightweight howitzer to the Indian Army. However,
this deal has already become embroiled in a corruption
scandal.68 Finally, South Korea is a potential source of
technology for India’s emerging shipbuilding industry
and potential partner for development and marketing
of other defense equipment.69
The Ukraine, Poland, and other former Soviet
republics are also potential defense partners with
India. The Ukraine inherited much of the former
Soviet defense industry and is licensed to produce a
number of Russian military systems. It currently has
contracts to service many of India’s Soviet-era aircraft
and vehicles. The two countries are also working on a
bilateral defense agreement and possible sales of major
end items, much to the chagrin of Russia.70 Poland is
interested in developing a defense supply relationship

29

focused on upgrading many of India’s Soviet-era
systems with new Polish technologies. Uzbekistan
signed an agreement on “Cooperation in Military and
Military-technical Matters” in 2005,71 and Kyrgyzstan
transferred some of its used MiG-21 fighters to India in
2003 according to the SIPRI Arms Transfer Database.
While much of the focus and attention has been
on India’s defense relationships with major or middle
powers, India has been solidifying its relationship with
many smaller and developing countries as well, many
of which are members of NAM. These relationships
are mostly based on India providing a source of
military training, often fully or partially funded by the
Government of India. Figures 1 and 2 show the extent
of military training provided to foreign countries by
India from 2000 to 2006. Figure 1 shows the number
of slots funded for many developing countries by
the Government of India Ministry of External Affairs
under the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation
program that was founded in 1964 and has grown
over the years.72 In many cases, especially developing
African countries, India is also the supplier of small
arms, ammunition, or commercial trucks and jeeps.73
India also provides military training teams to several
developing countries.74 Some of these relationships
have been further solidified in recent years through the
signing of simple memorandums of understanding for
defense cooperation. Cambodia, Indonesia, Nigeria,
Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates are known
to have such agreements. India has a specific interest in
cultivating relationships in the Middle-East as part of
its “look west” policy and a concern for energy security,
security of sea lanes, terrorism, and its large expatriot
worker populations.75 India’s defense agreement with
Oman includes port facility arrangements for resupply
of its naval ships while operating in the region.76
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Government of India Funded Foreign Military Students Studying in India.
2000*

2003*

2004

Afghanistan

2005

2006

4

70
1

Algeria
Bangladesh

38

27

31

23

28

Bhutan

1

2

2

2

1

1

Benin
Botswana

1

Burkina Faso

2

Cambodia

4

1
3

15

4
1

8

9

13

15

Congo

2

DPRK

2
1

Egypt

1

1
7

Eritrea
1

Ethiopia
Ghana

2

1

6

22

18

Indonesia

13

5

10

12

9

Kazakhstan

4

6

5

7

5

Kenya

3

6

6

Kyrgyzstan

1

6

4

2

6

Lao PDR

4

3

6

5

3

3

6

Lebanon
Lesotho
Malaysia

8

11

3

3

4

5

16

8

13

14

1

2

2

Maldives
Mauritius

39

22

28

39

38

Mongolia

4

1

4

5

8

Myanmar

20

23

26

45

36

31

Namibia

2

Nepal

3

Nigeria

2

8
3

3

2

3

9

18

18

1

Philippines
Russia

1

Seychelles

13

18

10

26

10

Sri Lanka

6

5

5

3

5

Syria

1

1

2

4

1

6

5

10

6

5

4

1

1

3

8

1

Sudan
32

Tajikistan
Tanzania

4

Thailand
Uganda

6

2

3

3

Uzbekistan

2

2

3

6

1

Vietnam

11

21

15

15

18

Zambia

4

3

11

12

3

Zanzibar
TOTAL

197

220

218

328

386

Note: 2000 and 2003 columns are slots that were accepted by the foreign
governments, whereas the subsequent years indicate slots offered only. These
slots were either fully or partially funded by the Ministry of External Affairs’
Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation program.

Figure 1. India’s Bilateral Relationships.77
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Self-funded or Reciprocal Foreign Military Students Studying in India.
2000*

2003*

2004

2

1

Bangladesh

3

3

3

Botswana

3

5

37

Australia

1

Chile
France

1

4

Germany

1

Iran

1

1

Kenya

1

6

Kuwait

1

1

1

1

1

Japan

4

Malaysia
Nigeria

15

3

Oman

7

1

Qatar

1

1

ROK

2

1

Singapore

1

25

1
3
3

South Africa
UAE

4

1

United Kingdom

4

4

4

United States

4

3

3

TOTAL

49

25

99

Note: 2000 and 2003 columns are slots that were accepted by the foreign
governments whereas 2004 indicates slots offered.

Figure 2. India’s Bilateral Relationships.78
China.
A specific discussion of bilateral defense relations
with India’s neighbors was intentionally excluded
from this monograph except as they relate to the
larger global dynamic because the regional dynamics
are significantly different and much has been written
on that topic already. China is the exception because
it sits in a unique position relative to India in that it
is part of India’s regional calculus as a neighbor, but
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also stands out as the lone exception in the region due
to its position as a major power. During his January
2008 visit to China, Prime Minister Singh described the
bilateral relationship by stating, “. . . our strategic and
cooperative partnership should be based on strong,
diversified and mutually beneficial economic ties.”79
The addition of the word “cooperative” in contrast to
most other countries where only “strategic” is used
clearly meant to send a signal to the Chinese that this
relationship is something special and different.
India has genuine concerns about China’s intentions
and growing presence in the Indian Ocean, and the
two countries still have unresolved border issues.
China’s military support to Pakistan remains a major
concern as well. Despite this, there has been significant
progress in rapprochement between the two Asian
powers, and some of this has spilled into the defense
relations. While the relationship has not progressed
to the Hindi-Chini-bhai-bhai (“India and China are
brothers”) of the 1950s, military-to-military contacts
are beginning to occur on a regular basis. India and
China signed a “Memorandum of Understanding on
Exchanges and Cooperation in the Field of Defense” in
2006 and conduct an annual defense dialog. The two
countries began conducting regular bilateral exercises
in 2008 focused on anti-terrorism and have exchanged
senior defense officials. India remains suspicious of
China, but understands that the future lies in securing
closer defense ties.
United States.
The U.S. defense relationship with India experienced
a number of ups and downs over the years. The first 4
decades of Indian independence were dominated by
Cold War politics with India’s previously discussed
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war with China being the pinnacle of U.S.-India
relations during that period. Despite this, the United
States consistently supported Indian officers attending
U.S. military schools through the International
Military Education and Training (IMET) program,
and U.S. officers attended India’s premier professional
military education schools.80 However, during those
years the Government of India did not place a lot of
strategic value on the person-to-person contacts these
opportunities provided (though the military services
valued the opportunities), and the United States could
never establish itself as a reliable source of defense
supply—the metric India used as a barometer of defense
relations. It seemed as if any time the two countries
made inroads, war with Pakistan, nuclear tests, or Cold
War politics would get in the way of closer defense
ties. As a result, the United States was branded as an
“unreliable supplier” within the Indian establishment.
This mindset endured through the 1990s despite many
attempts to overcome it. U.S. Army Pacific Commander
Lieutenant General Claude Kicklighter was moderately
successful at initially expanding military-to-military
contacts through low-level exercises and a regular
bilateral dialog at the army component-level of Pacific
Command through what became popularly known as
the “Kicklighter Accord” signed in 1991.81
Military-to-military contacts made better inroads
than defense supply to the bilateral relationship
for the following reasons—they were relatively
nonthreatening (as long as they were low-level), not
considered particularly important (or a barometer of
the relationship) and most importantly, did not require
a long-term commitment that had consequences if
broken. The 1995 “Agreed Minute” signed by Secretary
of Defense William Perry and Minister of State for
Defense M. Mallikarjun raised the level of bilateral
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relations to the Ministry of Defense and established
mechanisms at the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy-level for the United States to engage with India.
The 1998 nuclear test and subsequent sanctions brought
the relationship to a halt just as many initiatives were
beginning to take shape.82 However, the mechanisms,
such as the Defense Policy Group meetings and subordinate service Executive Steering Group meetings
were easily revived once sanctions were lifted in 2001.
The “reliable supplier” issue was last raised after the
1998 sanctions prevented India from obtaining spare
parts for its Sea King helicopters, even though they
were purchased from the UK. Many of the parts were
licensed U.S. technology that fell under the sanctions.
In one of his last acts in office, President Bill Clinton
lifted the sanctions on January 19, 2001.83 The memory
of these sanctions still lingers today, but the issue no
longer dominates the discussions. Significant inroads
to the relationship have since been made.
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and then
Minister of Defense Pranab Mukherjee signed a “New
Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship” in
2005, which formally introduced the idea of a “strategic
partnership” and laid out the areas of common
strategic interest. It also reaffirmed the Defense Policy
Group as the apex body of defense discussions and
its subordinate groups. Significantly, it added the
Defense Procurement and Production Group, which
aimed to bolster a newly emerging defense supply
relationship. Shortly after sanctions were lifted, India
completed a deal to purchase Q-37 Firefinder radars
from the United States that was begun in the 1990s and
put on hold due to the sanctions. This represented the
first major defense purchase from the United States in
over 4 decades.84 Since then, U.S. defense sales to India
have grown significantly and include major defense
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systems such as C-130J aircraft, P-8I maritime patrol
aircraft, H-3 Sea King helicopters, and the former
Austin-class amphibious transport dock, renamed INS
Jalashwa, and currently the second largest ship in the
Indian Navy. India will likely order C-17 Globemaster
aircraft to replace its fleet of Il-76 transport aircraft,85
and has invited the United States to participate in
tenders for medium multirole combat aircraft, attack
helicopters, heavy lift helicopters, and a wide range
of other equipment and services to include design
consultancy on some of its new warships.
U.S.-India bilateral military exercises have grown
in number, size, and scope as India has begun to see
the value of bilateral exercises being more than just the
person-to-person contacts. In addition to regular army
and naval exercises, the Indian Air Force participated
for the first time in the world-class Red Flag exercise
in the United States in August 2008.86 These exercises
provide the Indian military opportunities to observe
U.S. equipment and capabilities that they may be
interested in as the Indian military upgrades to newer
technologies. It also gives them exposure to new tactics
and doctrine that are necessary for the employment
of new military technologies. Since 2001, India and
the United States have conducted over 50 bilateral or
multilateral exercises.87
The level and frequency of senior defense contacts
between the United States and India has increased
significantly since 2001, to the point that the United
States eclipses all of the other countries in the frequency
of senior-level contacts. In 2008 alone, the Secretary
of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Secretary
of Defense, Chief of Army Staff, and Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff visited India at the highest
levels. At the three-star and lower levels the number
of visitors expands significantly. While not matching
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the frequency of U.S. visitors to India, Indian defense
leaders conducted a significant number of visits to
the United States, including the Minister of Defense
and many delegations to military bases and defense
industry.
The U.S.-India relationship holds great promise, but
a number of obstacles still exist. First and foremost are
the lingering suspicions of U.S. “reliability.” While there
is significant progress, these suspicions remain in the
back of the Indian mind and create hesitation on the part
of decisionmakers. This is sometimes exacerbated by
the political Left and its universally myopic opposition
to any engagement with the west. The necessary, but
often complicated and intimidating, U.S. arms export
control laws only serve to feed these suspicions. The net
result is an inability to come to agreement on a number
of substantive bilateral military agreements necessary
to move the relationship to the next level and failure
to resolve these issues may actually reverse progress
already made.88 End-use monitoring was agreed to
during Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s July 2009
visit to India, but it was not a smooth success. Several
opposition parties walked out of Parliament in protest
when it was announced.89
DOMESTIC LIMITATIONS
Many of the bilateral challenges for India’s
expanding defense relations were discussed in the
context of each individual country. However, a number
of systemic problems within the Indian bureaucracy
limit its ability to grow the number of “strategic
relationships.” Broadly, these can be grouped into four
main issues, three structural and one political. These
are summarized below.
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1. The sheer volume of expanding relationships has
placed a strain on India’s bureaucratic system, which
has so far not significantly changed to deal with the
scope of the new relationships. The Indian Ministry of
Defense does not have a large staff to deal with the
large number of foreign engagements in which it is
currently involved. The primary point of entry into
the ministry for foreign nations is through the Joint
Secretary for Planning and International Cooperation.
Despite the large increase in bilateral agreements since
2000, this office has not been significantly expanded to
accommodate the new relationships. Part of the way
the ministry has dealt with this is to delegate down
to the Integrated Defense Staff (IDS) or the individual
services. While this has helped by partially eliminating
a bureaucratic step (the Joint Secretary still oversees
most activities of the services), these staffs have not
grown to cope with the new relationships.90 Recently,
the IDS has taken a larger role, but still lacks the depth
of personnel to effectively manage the expanding
relationships. Even at this level, the IDS and military
services funnel relations through the respective
foreign liaison offices, but do not have corresponding
“desk officers” dedicated to managing the individual
bilateral relationships.
2. Foreign affairs is the domain of the Ministry of
External Affairs (MEA), which consequently has to
be involved in virtually all matters relating to foreign
relations, to include defense. The Ministry of Defense
has limited authority to conduct defense policy with
other nations without extensively consulting the MEA.
Again, the MEA is limited in the number of personnel
working on specific countries, providing another
chokepoint to developing bilateral defense relations.91
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3. The Government of India has a very hierarchical decisionmaking process whereby even minor
decisions need to be approved at very high levels of
the bureaucracy. This creates a major chokepoint for
getting things done and usually means the person
across the table in negotiations is not empowered
to make decisions. Most defense-related issues, to
include procurements, fall under the oversight of the
Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), a parliamentary
committee led by the Prime Minister that has oversight
over national security issues.92 The CCS generally only
meets very 2 weeks.
4. India’s system of government makes international
decisions highly dependent on domestic politics. India
uses the parliamentary system of government and since
the 1980s depends on a coalition to form a government.
These coalitions are often fragile and frequently subject
to the whims of relatively minor parties, not to mention
the opposition party(s) whose primary purpose is to
“oppose.” As a result, bilateral activities are sometimes
cancelled or modified just to appease coalition partners
or a particularly vocal opposition if elections are near.
Figure 3 illustrates a potential correlation between
the timing of national parliamentary elections and
the number of bilateral defense agreements. In 2004,
the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its coalition
lost the general election to the Congress Party-led
coalition. While the BJP began to negotiate a number
of bilateral defense agreements, these negotiations
were presumably placed on hold in the run-up to the
election. Subsequently, the winning Congress Party
coalition began to negotiate a number of agreements
shortly after taking power. The chart shows a gradual
increase which can be explained by the lag between the
beginning of negotiations and actual signing as well

40

as time for the new government to develop a foreign
policy.

Figure 3. India’s Bilateral Defense Agreements.
In the run-up to the 2009 general elections, the
number of defense agreements signed begins to taper
off. Because the previous (BJP-led) government lost
and had engaged in a number of agreements close
to the election, Congress may have taken a more
conservative approach to prevent foreign policy from
becoming a detriment in national elections. There are
many examples of the Communist Party coalition
members objecting to defense agreements, especially
with the United States.
While correlation does not always mean causality,
the anecdotal evidence suggests this to be at least a
partial explanation. The Congress Party won the 2009
elections with an even stronger mandate than before,
and without many of it more vocal coalition partners,
such as the Communists. India then agreed to U.S.
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end-use monitoring in July 2009, merely 2 months after
seating the new government. Therefore, it is likely that
we can expect more decisive decisions in future defense
agreements.
FROM NONALIGNMENT TO POLY-ALIGNMENT
The world has changed and the challenges have grown
more complex. The moral force that Pandit Nehru spoke
of was a force that came from the power of ideas and
from an abiding faith in the principles of justice and
reason. . . . We look forward . . . as we seek to fashion a
contemporary and compelling vision for the Nonaligned
Movement.93

Prime Minister Singh’s above statement at the
NAM summit at Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, on July 15,
2009, sought to reaffirm the relevance of the NAM
while recognizing it needed to change to deal with an
increasingly interconnected world. India is addressing
this challenge uniquely in an attempt to straddle its
commitment to nonalignment and its growing need to
secure necessary relationships globally.
The past decade for India was a scramble to establish
“strategic relationships” with most of the major
powers and many of the middle powers, China being
the lone exception with some progress made there too.
A good gauge of this is the number of bilateral defense
agreements concluded over the years (see Figure 3).
India concluded only seven new bilateral agreements
from 1947 to 2000, and four of those were in the decade
between 1990 and 2000; however, from 2000 to 2008 India concluded 19 new agreements. Beyond this, many
other countries have defense-related agreements with
India that are embedded in broader bilateral agreements. The few agreements prior to the end of the cold
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war were largely borne out of necessity—to procure
needed military equipment. In the post cold war
transition years (1990-2000), many of the agreements
were still borne out of procurement necessities that
were a result of shifting to western sources in lieu of the
former Soviet Union. However, there was a new element
introduced by the United States—that of military-tomilitary security cooperation. The new agreements
that followed after 2000 increasingly adopted various
aspects of defense cooperation beyond defense
procurement including bilateral exercises, exchanges,
and training. Nonalignment in the traditional sense as
a foreign policy started to unravel as more and more
bilateral defense agreements were brokered.
This is an important departure from the past where
India was more inclined to assert “nonalignment”
in international relations and avoid entanglements.
Instead of avoiding alignments all together, India is now
seeking to align with (just about) everyone, or become
“poly aligned.” However, it is not a significant leap in
terms of the broader effects on its global relationships.
By establishing a broad range of alignments with
many countries, India is able to maintain its stand on
multilateralism and much of its nonalignment ideology while reaping the benefits of having strategic
relationships with other countries. India still perceives
and presents itself to be “nonaligned” as indicated by
the quote at the beginning of this section. However,
many of its actions are increasingly in the direction of
“poly-alignment.”
Following the end of the Cold War, India began
to actively promote the idea of a multipolar world as
an alternative to the unipolar world led by the United
States. As India emerged from its financial crisis of the
early 1990s, it also became aware of its own opportunity
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to be a “pole” in the multipolar world. Indian pundits
often suggested that the poles would include Russia,
the United States, the EU, China, Japan, and India. This
was often represented in the 1990s by a hexagon with
five solid sides and one dashed side for India. Today,
the inclination of most Indians would be to depict the
hexagram with six solid sides.94 This view has often
manifested itself through promotion of UN Security
Council reform that includes India as a new permanent
member. India sought to develop support for its case
by establishing “strategic partnerships” that would
likely result in votes for India. Frequently, bilateral
agreement signings or joint statements (not limited
to the defense sector) are accompanied by statements
supporting a bid for a permanent Security Council seat
for India.95
The defense sector presents an opportunity to cement these relationships through defense trade, which
India had previously nominally considered a significant
measure of the relationship, at least with countries like
Russia and France. As an illustration of the changes, in
2001 Aero India was dominated by Indian companies,
attended mostly by Russian, Ukrainian, French, and
Israeli companies and had 10 other lightly represented
countries.96 The representation of countries was
generally reflective of India’s external relationships,
taking into consideration potential defense exports
from those countries. At Aero India 2009, 25 foreign
countries were heavily represented and for the first
time, the number of foreign exhibitors exceeded the
number of Indian exhibitors.97 Recognizing India’s
opening of the defense sector and the potential of
India’s increasing defense procurement budget, the
presence of foreign defense suppliers has blossomed
in India. Many of the supplier countries also see the
political and symbolic signal major deals convey and
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have gone to great lengths to court the Indian defense
market. This change in interest in India is precipitated
by a combination of the following factors and changes
in India to attract potential suppliers that can contribute
to an enhanced defense relationship while meeting
critical defense needs for the military.
• Since the late 1990s, India’s economy has been
growing at a rate of over 8 percent and with
defense expenditures generally allocated as a
percentage of gross domestic product, India is
now increasingly able to afford coveted western
technologies.
• Publication of the first edition of the Defense
Procurement Procedure in 2002 removed a lot
of opacity in India’s procurement process and
mandated a competitive bid process for foreign
procurement.98 Subsequent editions were
increasingly favorable to western companies.
• Procurement tenders place a lot of emphasis on
technology transfer, licensed production, and
reinvestment through defense offsets.99 These
types of arrangements create more symbiotic
relationships than simple purchases.
• Relaxation of rules on foreign investment in
the defense sector, enabling foreign companies
to own up to 26 percent of defense sector
undertakings, with a possible increase to
49 percent in the near future.100 This has the
additional benefit of attracting co-development
partners and new technology.
• Unhappiness with Russia as a defense supplier
in terms of both quality of defense articles
and perennial problems with price escalation
and delayed delivery has created a significant
motive for diversification of the supply base.101
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Another area that indirectly contributed to
India’s shift from nonalignment to poly-alignment
is its participation in UN peacekeeping operations.
With the exceptions mentioned previously in India’s
neighborhood, India has maintained a policy of
noninterference with the exception of UN peacekeeping
missions. The UN provides the cover that India needs
to remain nonaligned yet still contribute on the global
stage as one of the top three contributors to UN
missions. However, in the past decade the international
community (including the United States) and the UN
have taken initiatives to conduct multilateral training
on UN tasks. This had the effect of further promoting
the importance of multilateral exercises and events.
Prior to that, India was responsible for its own training
and seldom participated in training outside of India.
While there are no specific data to support it, there is a
presumption that the increased exposure to the global
military and political environment as a result of UN
peacekeeping missions has increased India’s need and
desire for greater military contacts globally.
Beyond poly-alignment, India has also begun to
directly assert itself as a regional power, especially as it
acts on its concerns about Chinese expansionism in the
Indian Ocean. To facilitate this, it is seeking to convert
its brown-water navy to a blue-water navy, evidenced
by the acquisition of new aircraft carriers, submarines,
and larger surface vessels. India’s Air Force is also
expanding its reach through purchases of air-to-air
refuelers and longer range transport aircraft. These
expansions of capability go beyond the capabilities
needed to address the traditional border threats from
China and Pakistan and portend a greater concern
for strategic issues, including protection of shipping
lanes, energy resources, and India’s large expatriot
populations in the Middle East and Mediterranean.102
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India contributes to counterpiracy operations off the
Horn of Africa, primarily to protect its own interests,
but nominally coordinating with other countries
conducting operations in the region.103 There are also
reports of India establishing a network of listening
posts in places like Madagascar and Mauritius to
monitor activity in the Indian Ocean.104
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
The rapid warming of relations between India and
the United States over the past decade is proving to
be a significant, yet challenging, new relationship. The
new opportunity for tens of billions of U.S. dollars in
defense-related sales, while not necessarily the most
important part of the relationship, are a significant
enabler that will open up countless new opportunities
to grow the bilateral defense relationship. Because
many of the U.S. defense technologies have important
applications in domestic counterterrorism, these sales
also expand opportunities well beyond the two defense
establishments into law enforcement and border
control issues. Despite the tremendous opportunities,
U.S. policymakers need to keep a few things in mind as
the Indo-U.S. defense relationship moves into new and
unexplored territories.
• The NAM will continue to be a central component
of the way India formulates its foreign policy.
To a lesser extent, India will look to the UN as a
way of forming global consensus on multilateral
issues (that do not adversely affect India). At
the same time, India will fiercely protect its own
internal and bilateral issues from becoming part
of the international dialog (Kashmir being the
most obvious example).
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• Domestic politics will continue to be a dominant
force in the decisions India makes, including
its foreign policy. This is an artifact of the
hypersensitivity any ruling party or coalition
has to domestic issues and the real or perceived
impact of foreign policy on the electoral vote
banks. Similarly, minority coalition partners in
the government will continue to influence some
foreign policy decisions by acting as the spoiler,
especially with regard to the larger powers.
• As an extension of its NAM policy, India will
continue to view its relationship with the United
States through the lens of multilateralism,
preference for a multipolar global power structure, and the impact on its bilateral relations
with other countries.
• India will continue to forge new defense
relationships around the world, increasingly
with a view to exporting defense material from
its own developing industry. However, it will
likely begin to shift its energy towards deepening many of the relationships it has established
to date.
• India will increasingly assert itself as a regional
power in the Indian Ocean. Most of the time, its
interests will nominally converge with those of
the United States (such as current counterpiracy
operations) yet will not necessarily formally
“align” with the United States; however,
occasionally India’s interests may diverge (such
as Indian support to Mauritius’ claim to Diego
Garcia105), creating potential irritants in the
relationship.
• India will likely emphasize balance in its defense
relations, especially with the larger powers of

48

the United States, Russia, the EU, UK, and Israel.
This balance will often be reflected in defense
procurement decisions, as these are enduring
symbols of the bilateral relationship. Most
bilateral and multilateral military exercises will
not be affected with considerations of balance,
with the exception of larger, more visible
exercises.
CONCLUSION
India’s interests have changed over the past 2
decades from a position of nonalignment to one of
having specific strategic interests that lead it to a path
of “poly-alignment.” This path appears to be following
four specific, but intermingled, courses:
1. Become a regional power across the Indian
Ocean basin and secure agreements from partners in
this region that support this goal, while building up
expeditionary navy and air force capabilities. At the
same time, India continues to modernize its army
to deal with potential threats from its immediate
neighbors and internal insurgency groups.
2. Develop “strategic partnerships” with countries
perceived as leaders of a global, multipolar order, and
seek modern military capabilities from many of those
countries. This includes modern weapon systems
as well as the technology and licensed production
associated with those weapon systems.
3. Secure or maintain ties with smaller countries
globally, many of which are members of the nonaligned
movement, that can provide support in international
fora as well as provide potential markets for India’s
own emerging defense industry.
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4. Maintain a position of leadership in the NonAligned Movement and publicly present itself as
“nonaligned” despite its actual alignments.
Many of the recent changes in India’s global defense
relationships represent a vast departure from past
policy and practices. Given that the Congress Party
and its United Progressive Alliance coalition received
a strong electoral mandate when it was reelected in
May 2009, these changes are likely to continue and
perhaps will lead to bold moves to further develop
and deepen strategic relationships around the world.
As India cements its expanding defense relationships
through the purchase of major defense platforms and
the associated technology transfers and co-production
agreements, it will define the course of its long-term
relationships for the coming decades. All of this
presents a mixed bag of significant opportunities and
challenges for bilateral defense relationships.
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“India has a strategic
partnership with both
Brazil and South Africa.”10

Brazil

“…elevate our relations
to a level that reflects
our mutual strengths and
complementarities.”24

Egypt

- Indo-Egypt Joint
Defense Committee
Meeting (AddlSec)25

- Peoples Liberation Army
Navy Commander (Nov
08)21

- Annual Defense Dialog20

“…our strategic and
cooperative partnership
should be based on
strong, diversified and
mutually beneficial
economic ties.”18

- Commander-in-Chief,
Royal Cambodian Armed
Forces (2006)16

- Army Chief (Dec 06)13

- Chief of
Australian Defense Force
(May 07)7
- Australian Naval Chief
(Aug 07)8
- Australian Defense
Minister (Jul 07)9

High Level Delegations
To India

China

- MoU On Exchanges
and Cooperation in the
field of Defense (2006)19

- Joint Defense
Committee12

- Maritime Security
Operations Working
Group6

Bilateral Forums

- Defense Minister (Feb
08)17

- MoU on Defense
Cooperation (2007)15

- Agreement on
Defense Cooperation
(2003)11

- Memorandum
of Understanding
(MoU) on Defense
Cooperation (2006)4
- Information Sharing
Agreement (2007)5

Bilateral Agreements

Canada

Cambodia

“Relations between
Australia and India are
evolving into a strong
partnership”3

Relationship Description1

Australia

Country
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- Hand-in-Hand, 2008
annual anti-terrorism
exercise22
- Naval exercise23

- Ibsamar Trilateral
Naval Exercise (May
08)14

- Milan multilateral
naval exercise

Bilateral / Multilateral
Exercises

- $378 million
- Embraer ERJ-145
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Iran

Indonesia

Germany

France

Country

“…a continuing close and
rich bilateral relationship
between our countries.”42

“We have reaffirmed
our strong mutual
commitment to the
strategic partnership that
was launched in 2001.”34

“India and France enjoy
a close and wide ranging
strategic partnership”26

Relationship Description1

- Defense
Cooperation Agreement
(2006)

- Defense and Security
Cooperation Agreement
(2006)35
- Agreement on the
Mutual Protection of
Classified Information
(2007)36

- MoU on Supply of
Defense Equipment
(1982)
- Gov to Gov agreement
on defense (1998)27
- Defense Cooperation
agreement (2006)28

Bilateral Agreements

- Joint Defense
Cooperation Committee40
-- Navy-to-Navy Staff
Talks

- Defense Secretaries
Meeting (DefSec)
-- Strategic Defense
Cooperation
-- Defense Technical
Cooperation
-- Military to Military
Cooperation37

- Indo-French Strategic
Dialog
- Indo-French High
Committee on Defense
Cooperation (DefSec)
-- Sub Committee on
Military Cooperation
-- Sub Committee on
Strategic Issues
-- Sub Committee
on Defense Industry
Procurement and
Research and
Technology29

Bilateral Forums

- Iranian Navy Commander
(Mar 07)43
- Iranian President (Apr
08)44

- Indonesian Navy Chief
(Apr 07)41

- Defense Secretary (Apr
07)38
- German Defense Minister
(Jun 07)39

- French Defense Minister
(Apr 03)30
- Chief of French Army
(Nov 07)31

High Level Delegations
To India

- Naval Exercise
(2003,2006)45

- Varuna annual
Naval exercise32
- Garuda annual AF
exercise33

Bilateral / Multilateral
Exercises

- $169 million
- Dornier 228 Aircraft

- $2 billion
- Mirage 2000
- SM-39 Exocet
- Mirage 2000-5
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“…work towards the
establishment of a
strategic partnership…”53

“They reaffirmed the
importance of the
Strategic and Global
Partnership…”60

“[The] two Sides agreed
to establish and develop
a strategic partnership
based on the principles
of sovereignty and
equality.”70

Italy

Japan

Kazakhstan

Madagascar

Kyrgyzstan

“We share a number of
cherished values.”46

Relationship Description1

Israel

Country

- Lease for Naval
Listening Post (2006)73

- possible agreement on
Defense Cooperation71

- MoU On Maritime
Security And Coast
Guard Cooperation
(2006)61
- Joint Declaration on
Security Cooperation
(2008)62

- MoU for Defense
Cooperation in the field
of Defense Equipment
(1994/2003)54

-Intelligence Sharing
(2007)47

Bilateral Agreements

- Defence Policy Dialogue
(DefSec)63
-- military-to-military
talks64

- Joint Working Group on
Defense55

- India-Israel Joint
Defense Committee
(DefSec)
-- India-Israel Joint
Working Group on
Defense Cooperation48

Bilateral Forums

- Defense Minister (Nov
2005)72

- CoS Japan Maritime Self
Defense Force (Feb 06)65
- CoS Japan Ground SDF
(Mar 06)66
- CoS Japan Air SDF (Apr
06)67
- Japanese Defense
Minister (Aug 07)68

- Italian Defense Minister
(2003)56
- Under Secretary of State
for Defense (Nov 06)57
- Italian Defense Minister
(May 07)58
- Italian Army Chief (Nov
08)59

- Israeli Air Chief (Feb 04)49
- Israeli Naval Chief (Aug
07)50
- Israeli Army Chief (Sep
08)51

High Level Delegations
To India

- Participant in
Malabar 2007
- Sahyog-Kaijin Coast
Guard anti-piracy
exercise69

- Army Exercise
- Air Force Exercise52

Bilateral / Multilateral
Exercises

- $ unknown
- MiG-21 transfer

- $2.3 billion
- Phalcon (AWACS)
- BVRAAM
- EL/M-2032 Radar
- Barak-8 SAM
- SPYDER SAM
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- Agreement on
Defense Cooperation
(2006)92

- Agreement on
Defense Cooperation
(2003)93

Philippines

Poland

- Joint Working Group
on Defense Cooperation
(Sec(Def Prod))94

- Joint Military
Cooperation Council
(DefSec)89

- MoU on Defense
Cooperation (2005)88

Oman

“Oman and India are
united in our resolve to
cement our relationship
into a mighty strategic
relationship,”87

- MoU on Defense
Cooperation (2007)85

Nigeria

- Defense Minister (Nov
08)95

- Under Secretary for
Defense (May 06)90

- Defense Minister (Feb
06)86

- Defense Minister (Mar
06)84

- Agreement on
Defense Cooperation
(2006)82

Mozambique

- Commissioner of Police
(Jan 06, Feb 08)80

- Defense Minister (Jun 06,
Jan 08)76
- Chief of Malaysian Army
(Dec 06)
- Malaysian Chief of Air
Force (Feb 07)77

High Level Delegations
To India

- Minister of National
Defense (Feb 07)
- Chief of Mongolian Air
Force and Air Defense
(Feb 07)81
- Joint Working Group.83

- Malaysia-India Defense
Cooperation Meeting
(DefSec)75
-- Sub-Committee for
Military Cooperation

Bilateral Forums

Mongolia

- Defense Agreement
(1974)79

Mauritius

Bilateral Agreements

- MoU on MalaysiaIndia Defence
cooperation (1992)74

Relationship Description1

Malaysia

Country

- Biennial Naval
Exercises91

- Milan multilateral
naval exercise
- “passage exercise”
(May 08)78

Bilateral / Multilateral
Exercises

- $260 million
- WZT-3 Armored
Recovery Vehicle
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Singapore

“India’s relations
with Singapore have
evolved into a strong
partnership.”109

- India-Singapore
Defense Cooperation
Agreement (2003)110
- 5 year agreement for
AF training on Indian AF
bases (2007)111
- Agreement for joint
Army training on Indian
Army bases (2008)112

- Indo-Soviet Treaty of
Peace, Friendship and
Co-operation (1971)99
- Bilateral Defence
Cooperation Agreement
(1998)100
- Joint Development
Agreement on 5th gen
fighter (2007)101

“We are satisfied with the
overall development of our
strategic partnership.”98

Russia

Bilateral Agreements

- Defense and Security
Cooperation Agreement
(2008)96

Relationship Description1

Qatar

Country

- India-Singapore
Defence Policy Dialogue
(DefSec)113
-- Joint Working Group on
Intelligence114

- India-Russia
Inter- Governmental
Commission on Military
Technical Cooperation
(DefMin)102
-- subgroups on aviation,
shipbuilding and
landforces103

Bilateral Forums

- Minister for Defense (Oct
06)115
- Permanent Secretary of
Defense (Oct 07)116
- Chief of Defense
Forces117

- Defense Minister (Jun
06)104
- Commander-in-Chief of
the Russian land forces
(Jun 07)105
- Defense Minister (Sep
08)106

- CoS Qatari Armed Forces
(Aug 06)97

High Level Delegations
To India

- Sindex annual AF
exercise118
- Participant in
Malabar 2007
- Milan multilateral
naval exercise

- Indra annual Army
and AF anti-terror
and search and
destroy exercise107
- Indra biannual
Naval exercise108

Bilateral / Multilateral
Exercises

- $13.5 billion
- AT-14 Kornet
- Gorshkov aircraft carrier
- Tunguska AD system
- Smerch MRL
- MiG-29s
- Talwar frigate
- Akula nuclear sub
(lease)
- Mi-17 helicopters
- SU-30s
- T-90 Tanks
- BMP-2 IFV
- Mi-17V-5 (armed)
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“Long Term Cooperative
Partnership for Peace and
Prosperity”125

South Korea

- Bilateral Defense
Agreement (draft
2009)135

- MoU on Defense
Cooperation (2003)136

United Arab
Emirates

- Bilateral Defense
Agreement for Air Base
Access (2002)129

- MoU on Defense
Industry and Logistics
Cooperation (2005)
- MoU on Coast Guard
cooperation (2006)126

- MoU concerning
Cooperation in the Field
of Defense Equipment
(1996)
- Agreement on
Defense Co-operation
(2000)
- Agreement on Supply
of Defense Equipment
(2003)120

Bilateral Agreements

Ukraine

Thailand

“We are building a wide
ranging and intensive
relationship…”128

“India has a strategic
partnership with both
Brazil and South Africa.”119

South Africa

Tajikistan

Relationship Description1

Country

- Joint Defense
Cooperation Committee137

- Indo-Thai Joint Working
Group (Navy)

- India-South Africa Joint
Defense Committee121

Bilateral Forums

- CoS UAE Land Forces
(Nov 06)138
- Naval Chief (Jan 09)139

- Commander-in-Chief
Royal Thai Air Force (Sep
06)132
- Commander-in-Chief
Royal Thai Navy (Mar
07)133

- Defense Minister (Jan 05)
- First Deputy Defense
Minister (2006)130

- Minister of National
Defense (May 07)127

- Chief of S. African Army
(Sep 07)122
- Chief of S. African Navy
(Feb 07)123

High Level Delegations
To India

- Maitree Army
counter-terrorism
exercise (2007)134

- Transport and
para-drop exercise
(2003)131

- Ibsamar Trilateral
Naval Exercise (May
08)124

Bilateral / Multilateral
Exercises
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Uzbekistan

“…developing and
strengthening the
strategic partnership with
the United States”152

“…imparted a fresh
momentum to our
strategic partnership.”140

United Kingdom

United States

Relationship Description1

Country

- Agreement on
Cooperation in Military
and Military-Technical
Matters (2005)166

- Kicklighter Agreement
on Defense (1991)
- Agreed minute of
defense Cooperation
(1995)
- General Security of
Military Information
Agreement (2002)153
- New Framework for
the U.S.--India Defense
Relationship (2005)154

- Defence Equipment
Cooperation
Memorandum of
Understanding (1997)141

Bilateral Agreements

- Defense Policy Group
(DefSec)--4 sub-groups:
-- Defense Procurement
and Production Group
-- Joint Technical Group
-- Military Cooperation
Group
-- Senior Technology
Security Group155

- India-UK Defense
Consultative Group
(DefSec)--3 sub-groups:
-- Mil-Mil Contacts
-- Defense Equipment
-- Research and
Technology142

Bilateral Forums

- PACOM Commander
(May 09)156
- Secretary of the Navy
(Mar 08)157
- Chief of Naval Operations
(Apr 08)158
- Secretary of Defense
(Feb 08)159
- Chief of Army Staff (Oct
08)160
- Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff (Dec 08)161

- British Chief of Defence
Staff (May 02)143
- Permanent Under
Secretary for Defence (Apr
04)144
- Defence Minister (Oct
04)145
- British Army chief (Oct
07)146

High Level Delegations
To India

- Yudh Abhyas
bilateral Army
exercise (May 02)162
- Malabar Naval
Exercise
- Cope India Air
Force Exercise163
- Red Flag Air Force
Exercise (Aug 08)164
- Vajraprahar Army
CT exercise
- Multiple special
forces exercises
annually165

- Emerald Mercury
joint exercise (Mar
05)147
- Konkan Naval
exercise in India
and UK on alternate
years148
- Himalayan Warrior
Army-Marine
exercise in India (Oct
07)149
- Lion’s Strike and
Wessex Warrior Army
Exercises in UK (Sep
08)150
- Indradhanush AF
Exercise151

Bilateral / Multilateral
Exercises

- $3.4 billion
- TPQ-37 firefinder radars
- Trenton landing platform
dock
- UH-3H helicopters
- C-130J aircraft
- P-8I Maritime Patrol
aircraft

- $1.7 billion
- Jaguar aircraft
- Hawk trainer aircraft
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